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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



PLANNING AND EDUCATION FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy).

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ABSTRACT

The Department of Defense is hampered by a three-part problem: Due to a structural professional military education deficiency civil affairs officers lack the planning capability needed for the conduct of joint civil-military operations at the operational and strategic levels; There is insufficient staff structure at the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands to leverage civil affairs officer/civil-military operations planning capabilities in support of full spectrum operations; The civil-military operations planning capability gap has its roots in the tactically focused, service specific training programs. An advanced professional military education program designed to instruct civil affairs officers for the operational and strategic levels of planning has been through the proof of concept stage but needs widespread implementation in order for the specialty to continue to evolve and remain relevant to the Department of Defense.

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To my wife, thank you for helping revise this thesis and putting up with the working weekends. And to my sons, I promise to make up for our missed time together!

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Chapter 1 - Civil-Military Operations Overview

Wars over ideology have given way to wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health are increasingly shared; and the same tools that empower individuals to build enable them to destroy.¹

National Security Strategy 2010

In an era beset by global recession, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and persistent conflict, the use of military power as an element of national power has drawn increased scrutiny. The U.S. is intently focused on conflict in Southwest Asia where strife continues without a conventional military victory yet lacking a sufficiently broad “whole of government” perspective to enable success through other means. In Southwest Asia, the desired end state is not defeat of a nation-state but the synchronized use of all elements of national power to facilitate national and regional stability in support of U.S. national interests. Opportunities for success in ongoing operations rest on the ability of planners and strategists to stabilize civil-military interactions and establish enduring self-government capabilities. Due to a fundamental lack of synchronization of elements of U.S. national power, military planning has grown in importance. Commanders and their staff must execute military operations through meticulous planning and coordination with other governmental agencies to ensure success. This is especially true for civil-military operations in an environment that must

¹ United States, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington DC: White House, 2010), 1.

be inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) in nature to succeed.

The success of executing JIIM coordinated military operations is directly impacted by the knowledge, training, education, and abilities of the planners involved. Military officers are generally quite familiar with planning processes focused on the precise and synchronized application of military capabilities. It may be a paradox that even highly experienced officers may not be sufficiently cognizant of the complexity of planning combat operations, the core capability of the military. Yet, synchronizing combat operations with civil-military operations is even more complex and fraught with difficulties. This should not be surprising; most officers do not have experience working with non-combatants, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and interagency partners or may even be averse to doing so. Thus, planning civil-military operations may be difficult for officers who are trained in related but largely different skill sets. Planning operations related to enabling of civil authorities to reestablish governmental control is often done by personnel trained for something else. This premise is basic and plays heavily in the author's recommendations and conclusions in Chapter Four.

The author's thesis is: For civil affairs to remain relevant as a strategic capability of military power, a new educational training model and certain structural changes must be developed, all in conjunction with expansion of relevant staff structures. This is essential to meet joint commanders' needs for a truly effective civil-military operations planning capability.

During periods of conflict, military commanders are responsible for planning and executing operations affecting non-combatants and civilian institutions in their area of control. These actions, designated “civil-military operations,” are defined as activities a commanding officer uses to “establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.”² Ironically, most military planners are not trained in civil affairs yet drive the planning of civil-military operations and make decisions without consulting civil affairs specialists. In the process, they clearly demonstrate the difficulties related to understanding the complexities of civil-military operations. That is because there is as much art as science in planning and executing civil-military operations.

In contrast to conventional military operations, desired civil-military outcomes are difficult to accurately predict and measure. There are no standard templates instructing planners on the intricacies of civil-military operations that are comparable to those available to guide armored or infantry planning. Civilian entities often do not have neatly defined organizations; instead, civilian entities are more likely to rely upon a web of shared societal norms defining disparate people, places and activities. These civilians and their complex interactions often affect the overall success or failure of an operation.

Indeed, much is expected of military officers who are trained for combat and then are expected to “effect the peace” without appropriate training. Clearly, the nature of working with civilian U.S. governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and

² U.S. Department of Defense, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008), GL-6.

indigenous populations requires specialized training. In essence, there is a critical need for expert and adept engagement with non-combatants and civilian institutions.

There is a problem: Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, defines civil affairs as “forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.”³ Civil affairs specialists are enablers for the conduct of civil-military operations. Commanders are legally required to execute civil-military operations but are not trained in the intricacies involved and may or may not have civil affairs specialists to aid in developing, planning, and executing their responsibility to carry out these types of operations. Qualified civil affairs support for strategic-level planning and implementation of civil-military operations is not always available. Civil affairs training available focuses on the tactical level and lacks training content that enables civil affairs specialists to aid commanders at the strategic level. This is a key point. Planning and guidance for operations commences at the strategic level and provides direction to the subordinate operational and tactical levels. Still, even incompletely trained civil affairs personnel, have value in their ability to work by, through, and with civilian joint, inter-agency, intergovernmental and multi-national organizations. Clearly, the civil affairs educational gap at the strategic level needs to be addressed in order to aid commanders in the planning and execution of their responsibilities at this level.

Typically, military officers enter the civil affairs specialty after several years of service and are expected to function interchangeably upon completion of their civil affairs training, yet each service has its own civil affairs school disconnected from the

³ Ibid.

others. It is imperative that the Department of Defense (DoD) develop a shared civil affairs initial accession training course that can meet requirements for an interoperable civil affairs force. Further, civil affairs officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps possess different capabilities, with limited interoperability, due to the lack of a common frame of reference from their training base. Thus structure and capabilities of Army civil affairs units differ from Navy civil affairs units which in turn vary significantly from Marine Corps civil affairs units. Commanders expect certain levels of commonality in civil affairs capabilities that do not currently exist in the service training pipelines. This is further amplified as civil affairs officers progress through their careers to the operational and strategic levels and strive to become competent civil-military operations staff planners.

It is a paradox that civil-military operations *are* military operations and the responsibility of a military commander, but by their very nature they are not the type of operations that commanders are normally adequately trained to plan and execute. Therefore, civil affairs officers have developed into the link between the military and civilian worlds. These specialists serve as commanders' subject matter experts on civilian related matters and should serve as the *primary* planners for these complex civil-military operations.

The civil affairs training shortfall is further exacerbated by service approaches. Specifically, the problem is that the services focus at the tactical level. This includes differences in their perceived civil affairs and civil-military operations goals and discrete training programs. It is not surprising that there is an atmosphere of disagreement among the services about the value and direction of strategic level education for civil-military

operations. Tactically focused training needs standardization among the services. This is essential for successful JIIM civil-military operations planning and execution above the tactical level.

The problems are numerous. The DoD is hampered by a three-part problem: Due to a structural professional military education deficiency, civil affairs officers lack the planning capability needed for the conduct of joint civil-military operations at the strategic level; There is insufficient staff structure at the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands to leverage civil affairs officer/civil-military operations planning capabilities in support of full spectrum operations; The civil-military operations planning capability gap has its roots in the tactically focused, service specific training programs. To make matters worse, there is not an advanced professional military education program designed to instruct civil affairs officers for the operational and strategic levels of planning. This needs to be corrected.

The Nation and military are engaged in a conflict hindered by inadequate or incomplete civil-military operations planning. It is increasing apparent that the same coordination problems found in Southwest Asia also hinder steady state, or shaping operations, across the world. Cooperation and planning with other civilian organizations and U.S. government agencies will aid in success. These realizations point to the DoD's need for a resourceful cadre of capable and strategically minded civil affairs officers. In order for civil affairs to remain truly relevant it must continue to evolve.

Since World War II, the Army has not substantially changed the capabilities found within civil affairs. Meanwhile, the world has changed, the government has altered how it approaches problems, and the military has increased its emphasis on coordination,

planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction activities at the operational and strategic levels. The struggles faced at these levels highlight the need to reappraise the civil affairs capabilities and force structure required for continued viability at all levels of operations and throughout the full spectrum of military operations.

To complete a comprehensive review of civil-military operations and civil affairs planning capabilities **the author's methodology** is based primarily on a review of four sources of information including: journal literature and relevant books; joint and service doctrinal manuals; civil-military operations/civil affairs related federal laws and government policy documents; and interviews with personnel knowledgeable on the subject of strategic civil-military operations and educational developments in the civil affairs specialty.

In the next chapter the author analyzes and further expands on the definition of civil affairs and civil-military operations in the current context by: examining critical terminology; scrutinizing laws, policies and regulations sanctioning civil affairs and civil-military operations; and, analyzing civil affairs force structure. Civil affairs training and education programs are examined in Chapter Three to pinpoint failures to meet DoD needs and looks at possible courses of action. The crisis facing civil affairs education calls into question its viability as a relevant capability if corrective actions are not implemented. Finally, Chapter Four, contains recommendations that can improve the ability of civil affairs to become and remain a relevant, strategic instrument of national military power.

Chapter 2 - Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations

This chapter examines civil affairs and civil-military operations in order to understand the environment of joint and strategic level constraints. First, the abbreviated definitions of civil affairs and civil-military operations offered in Chapter One are expanded and additional operating terms relevant to this thesis are defined and their significance to the issues presented are analyzed. Clearly understanding the terms enables a common frame of reference. This section seeks to clarify the relationship between civil affairs and civil-military operations and how it affects planning and operations.

The next section analyzes and frames the international and national level legal and policy requirements that determine how laws and guidelines that affect the manner in which civil-military operations activities are planned and carried out.

Finally, this chapter offers an overview of the civil affairs force structures in the Army, Navy, and Marines from the viewpoint of their application to the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of war. This serves to identify civil affairs units and organizations designated to carry out civil-military operations planning and operations at the strategic level and determine their ability to accomplish those responsibilities.

Civil Affairs Activities

This section characterizes civil affairs and civil military operations from the national level policy and doctrinal perspective. At the policy level, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) defines and gives direction, while Joint Publication 3-57 offers the doctrinal definitions. Because the bulk of civil affairs forces are in the Army, the service perspective found in Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, serves to further refine and operationalize civil affairs activities.

In a recent report to Congress, OSD designated civil affairs as those forces and staff “designed to provide expertise to military commanders in their interaction with civil societies.”¹ These units and individuals must cover the full spectrum of military operations and are especially critical for irregular warfare as well as whole of government stability and reconstruction operations.² Department of Defense Instruction 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, states that the military has identified a requirement to develop “organizational concepts to employ civilian-military teams, including their command and control relationships, composition, resourcing, and interoperability for steady-state and surge activities.”³ It is OSD policy to maintain a capability “to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support Department of Defense missions.”⁴ Civil affairs is a critical supporting component to the spectrum of military operations.

The Secretary of Defense definition is further expanded upon in doctrine at the joint level in Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. It specifies the need for “[d]esignated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.”⁵ There is an inherently “joint” dimension in civil affairs with specialists found in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps at the tactical, operational, and strategic

¹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities, *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 3.

² Ibid., 5.

³ U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 5.

This directive defines Irregular Warfare on page 11 as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

⁴ U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1994), 2.

⁵ Joint Publication 3-57, GL-6.

levels of operations. These essential specialists carry out doctrinal missions for commanders at unified and specified commands as well as service component commands.

These civil affairs forces serve military commanders in carrying out their legal responsibilities for civil-military operations within an area of responsibility. Civil-military operations are defined in Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, as:

[A]ctivities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.⁶

At the strategic level, civil-military operations assist the Geographic Combatant Commander in linking theater security cooperation planning with regional engagement activities.⁷ Such planning can be best served by a strategically trained civil affairs officer to focus reconstruction, economic development, stability operations and other activities to support national strategic goals.

As the commander works to achieve goals at the strategic level, whether with a peacetime theater campaign plan or a contingency action, it is important to understand the definition of the five civil affairs core tasks and their application to civil-military operations objectives. The five tasks and definitions are:

⁶ Ibid., GL-6.

⁷ Ibid., I-5-6.

- **Population and Resource Control** assists host nation “governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers.”⁸
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance** is defined as “programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters.”⁹
- **Civil Information Management** is the process whereby civil information is collected, and shared “to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners.”¹⁰
- **Nation Assistance** is “civil or military assistance [other than Foreign Humanitarian Assistance] rendered to a nation by US forces”¹¹
- **Support to Civil Administration** “helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a [foreign nation’s] civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population”¹²

These operations are leveraged at all levels of operations but to ensure successful synchronization for the greatest operational benefit, they must be first promulgated at the strategic level by civil affairs experts. Success in civil-military operations in the five core areas is achieved by the integration of civilian and military actions. By facilitating these activities in a coordinated and integrated manner within military operations, U.S. national interests are achieved.

As reflected in its *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, OSD realizes that commanders and staffs are not entirely aware how to best employ civil affairs capabilities and is studying training requirements to remedy the situation.¹³ This suggests that current

⁸ Ibid., I-10.

⁹ Ibid., I-11.

¹⁰ Ibid., B-19.

¹¹ Ibid., I-12.

¹² Ibid., I-10.

¹³ DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, 11.

professional military education is not able to provide the required expertise to the same level as other battlefield functions.

Even though the majority of civil affairs officers are generalists, there is a small core of functional specialists. It usually falls to these specialists to plan, execute, and/or oversee a category of activities known as Civil Affairs Operations. These operations are designed to:

- Enhance relationships between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present;
- Require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and
- Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.¹⁴

Functional specialists, capable of planning and executing civil affairs operations, are found in teams in civil affairs battalions, brigades, and commands and “provide analysis in their specialty area that supports planning of interagency efforts or [host-nation] efforts.”¹⁵ What distinguishes civil affairs operations from civil-military operations is the application “of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority.”¹⁶ There are six functional specialty areas for technically qualified and experienced professionals who operate primarily at the

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57, GL-6.

¹⁵ Ibid., I-20.

¹⁶ Ibid., II-7.

strategic level. Even so, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, reality demonstrates significant shortfalls in training and certification.¹⁷

The six strategic-level functional areas are described below:¹⁸

- **Rule of law** is the application of effective law enforcement and criminal laws systems in legal institutions, police and corrections system.
- **Economic stability** is the management of goods, and services to ensuring a practical economic system.
- **Infrastructure** relates to developing and supporting public transport, communications, and utility systems.
- **Governance** is designed to manage governmental institutions and processes.
- **Public health and welfare** promotes the social and public health of a society.
- **Public education and information** resources and implements public education and information programs using media and educational programs.

“Civil-military integration” requires incorporating the efforts of civilian agencies and joint military actions, as guided by Presidential direction, to promote unified action.

Levels of cooperation and integration will vary depending upon the length and complexity of operations. Unfortunately, the procedures of other governmental agency often differ, and sometimes conflict. This is based on guidance, policies, culture, funding cycles, and decision-making processes. These all can challenge coordination and jeopardize successful action. This emphasizes not only the need for unity of effort but also what can impede progress. Furthermore, some non-governmental organizations and international governmental organizations are unable or unwilling to synchronize their

¹⁷ See Appendix A for civil affairs Functional Specialty Team composition at the battalion, brigade, and command levels.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.40, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), 2-4.

efforts with U.S. actions and military operations. Building consensus through vigorous coordination and willingness to communicate is crucial to success.¹⁹ Obviously, there are many opportunities for “fog and friction.”

Civil Affairs Related Philosophy, Law, and Policy

Civil-military operations are in demand in today’s conflict zone for both ethical and self-serving reasons. The ethical or humanitarian consideration evolved into international and national law from customary law. Among the legal precedents that aid in validating the circumstances under which war is deemed as legitimate and morally conducted, “bellum iustum,” more popularly known as Just War doctrine, is perhaps the best known, reasoned, and validated. The second reason is pure national self-interest, as pointed out by the Just War theorist Dr. Michael Walzer, “we have to fight justly so as not to antagonize the civilian population, whose political support is necessary for victory.”²⁰ This attitude is reflected in U.S. policies, directives, and doctrinal publications.

The first half of Just War doctrine, “jus ad bellum,” guides the analysis of validating justifications for going to war. “Jus in bello,” the second half of Just War doctrine, determines acceptable means of conducting war.²¹ In general, the second component of this doctrine, applicable to the rationale for civil-military operations, stipulates that combatants must consider if military action is proportional as it relates

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), II-9.

²⁰ Michael Walzer, *The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)*, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Academy, 2002), 8.

²¹ For an authoritative discussion of Just War doctrine consult: Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

between the military necessities of an action and the harm it may cause to civilians or their property. Such action cannot cause excessive harm to the civilian population and its properties out of proportion to the military advantage gained in the attack on a military objective. Dr. Walzer points out that in Vietnam “the way we fought the war almost certainly contributed to our defeat.”²²

“The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,” also known as the Fourth Geneva Convention, codifies these principles, and others, into international law imposing substantial obligations on occupying powers by defining humanitarian protections for civilians.²³ In a war zone, area of armed conflict, or occupied areas the convention requires the general protection of civilian populations against the consequences of war.

The requirements found in the Fourth Geneva convention are mirrored in U.S. national law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.²⁴ Examples of these requirements include prohibitions against inflicting unnecessary destruction or suffering in the accomplishment of military missions and the humane treatment of civilians. The list of protections includes unnecessary destruction of undefended towns, buildings dedicated to religion, science or art, and historical monuments.²⁵

²² Walzer, *The Triumph of Just War Theory*, 8.

²³ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949,” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html> (accessed February 22, 2011). See especially Section III, Articles 47-78.

²⁴ See also The Leiber Code of 1863 and Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907).

²⁵ For a complete listing of laws and protections see U.S. Department of the Army, *The Law of Land Warfare*, FM 27-10, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1956), especially Chapter 2, Section VI and Chapter 5.

At issue here is the apparent condition that few senior leaders seem to appreciate the requirement for humanitarian protections in an area of military operations and those that do view it as somebody else's job (i.e. State Department). What then are Department of Defense (DoD) responsibilities in regard to civil-military operations as required by law? Senior leaders must understand "the dynamics that underlie violent conflict, the diversity of actors and approaches engaged in transforming conflict, and the challenges of working constructively in a common operational environment."²⁶ This is consistent with the Geneva Convention; however, DoD and Department of State need realistic laws for how to conduct these stability and reconstruction operations. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, pursuing reconstruction before achieving stabilization fed the conflict. U.S. "reconstruction" policies for Iraq including dissolution of the Iraqi Army, the de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi government, and the elimination of all Iraqi state owned enterprises ultimately fed an active insurgency. This highlights the need for U.S. military and civilian leaders to understand U.S. policies intended to resolve these situations.

Once the ethical or humanitarian action reasons for civil-military operations action during times of conflict, as codified by international and national law, are understood it is necessary to look at the second part of the reasoning: care of civilian populations and civil-military operations as an expression of national self-interest. The most current communication of intent for U.S. civil-military operations policy, to leaders at all levels, is the *National Security Strategy* that states "America's commitment to

²⁶ Jim Embrey, "PKSOI Approach to Leader Development in Peace & Stability Operations," *Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online* 1, no. 2 (January 2011): 8.

democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.”²⁷ Just as “security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners” is an important interest, the bottom line is the gain to be had from respecting “universal values at home and around the world.”²⁸

The primary U.S. national-level instruction for reconstruction and stabilization of foreign countries is National Security Policy Directive-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, dated December 7, 2005. The purpose is to direct “improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance” for regions at risk.²⁹ The intention is to prevent these “territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to US foreign policy, security, or economic interest.”³⁰

Increasing coordination is vital. As a result of numerous failures, the President signed National Security Policy Directive-44 appointing the Department of State to coordinate and lead U.S. government efforts. However, the Department of State has encountered a capability gap vis-à-vis the responsibilities it received. With a constrained budget and a limited number of Foreign Service Officers to execute demanding missions worldwide, the Department of State found itself in no position to lead in any meaningful manner during stability operations on the ground, where large human and capital footprints are often required. Subsequently, the establishment of the Office of the State

²⁷ *National Security Strategy*, 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁹ U.S. President, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, National Security Presidential Directive 44, (Washington DC: White House, 2005), 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability, and organization of a U.S. government wide “Civilian Response Corps,” has developed an increased capability level but by and large, that is still inadequate. Thus the problems continue.

Here is the challenge, Department of State has the legal leadership authority in stabilization and reconstruction activities but is undercapitalized in comparison to military means and out of balance with the requirements. National Security Policy Directive-44 directs the Department of State and DoD to integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities where relevant. But with the limited capability wherewithal at Department of State, the military, based on a large and wide ranging pool of capabilities, moves into the vacuum and essentially takes over. While many commanders do not see reconstruction and stability operations as war fighting competencies, the military remains key to enabling the execution of reconstruction and stability operations.

Published June 27, 1994, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, provides the capabilities to enable DoD execution of responsibilities enumerated in National Security Policy Directive-44 and other policy instructions. This directive orders the maintenance of “a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support DoD missions and to meet component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations.”

The requirements are broad ranging and include, but are not limited to:

- Fulfill the responsibilities of the DoD Components under U.S. domestic and international law towards civilian populations.
- Minimize, to the extent feasible, civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian population.

- Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, with civilian agencies of other governments, and with non-governmental organizations.
- Exercise military control of the civilian population in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or other non-U.S. military authority.
- Provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement Department of Defense policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.³¹

This definition of civil affairs clarifies the intent that it assist in execution of the humanitarian purposes envisioned in “Just War” doctrine and meet the legal requirements of the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. In a synergistic manner, the same capabilities that enable civil affairs to carry out this legal function also allow it to enable DoD execution of National Security Presidential Directive-44.

Since publishing Department of Defense Instruction 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, in 1994, DoD has not developed an updated version. The instruction fails to designate an organization in charge of civil affairs. That task falls to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 167, which designates U.S. Special Operations Command as the body in charge of the force structure and proponency.³² This no longer remains feasible as only one brigade of civil affairs force structure remains under U.S. Special Operations Command’s operational

³¹ DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, 2.

³² For the purpose of this paper proponency is defined as responsibility for developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics.

control. The Navy and Marine Corps also have civil affairs force structure outside of special operations. In the Army the majority of the forces are in the Army Reserves which is now controlled by U.S. Joint Forces Command. U.S. Special Operations Command retains proponency, but there are Secretary of Defense initiatives pending that may alter that arrangement.³³

If civil affairs is to remain relevant as an enabler, it must continually evolve, not just as a military force, but also as a joint capability. The force structure has matured considerably with the growth of civil affairs units in the Navy and Marine Corps. It has also grown in the Army with the addition of conventional and special operations civil affairs units. It is worthy of further study to determine the proper placement of civil affairs forces and proponency as its roles in the conventional force develop that were not foreseen when Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, was published.

The primary mission of the military is to fight and win our Nation's wars, but Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, dictates the provision for adding a civil-military operations type mission. The document states that "stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations."³⁴ Implied is the expectation of the employment of integrated civilian and joint military efforts. This requirement includes the capacity and capability for establishing civil security and civil control, restoration or

³³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Track Four Efficiency Decisions, Annex Baseline Organizational Assessment Study Group Decisions," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 21.

³⁴ U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Stability Operation*, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 2.

provision of essential services, repairing critical infrastructure, and providing humanitarian assistance.³⁵

The conduct of military forces and the treatment of civilians in a conflict zone are based on moral, ethical, humanitarian and international legal perspectives. Concurrently, civil-military operations are essential to meet these requirements as developed from foundations in Just War doctrine, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and as further codified in U.S. national laws, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and various directives and instructions. Self-interest is evident in actions that seek to portray a benevolent military working to earn political support for military endeavors. Without the support of the population, military victory is hollow if the battles are won, but the war is lost.

Civil Affairs Force Structure

The vast majority of civil affairs qualified individuals are not in staff positions where they can have a positive impact on the strategic planning process. To the contrary, most are in civil affairs units that execute both civil-military operations and civil affairs operations in support of tactical and operational-level military commanders. From these units a small number of cells and teams are designated to augment a commander's staff in support of operations and rarely in support of planning.

The DoD identified approximately 7,500 civil affairs qualified individuals across the services, the majority of which, approximately 94% of all civil affairs forces, are found in the Army³⁶ with smaller numbers in the Navy and Marine Corps. Also complicating the situation, today approximately 90% of civil affairs forces are in the

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, 7.

Army Reserve.³⁷ As an unintended consequence, the Army established the “Civil Affairs and Military Government” career field in 1955, due to it being a heavily reserve-centric force, as a non-accession Army Reserve branch. It was later redesignated as the “Civil Affairs” branch in 1959 but still only for the Army Reserves. Finally, in October 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army General Orders 29 established civil affairs as a basic branch for active duty Army officers in recognition of the expanded mission.³⁸ The Navy and Marine Corps designate civil affairs qualified personnel with a secondary military occupational skill identifier. The complications from these actions are obviously counter-productive.

As noted, the majority of Army civil affairs units are in the Army Reserve. The only active duty civil affairs unit, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, assigned to U.S. Army Special Operations Command, is considered a special operation force vice conventional force. The brigade is composed of four battalions, each with four companies. Battalions focus on support to one of the theater special operations commands and other special operations units. A fifth battalion, also composed of four companies, is pending activation in 2012 to support U.S. Africa Command’s theater special operations command. As a headquarters, the brigade has not deployed in a contingency nor have the battalion headquarters.

Although, doctrinally, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade can deploy Civil Affairs Planning Teams to the Joint Force Commander, the majority of the deployable forces’ civil affairs teams are led by Captains and deploy in support of special operations forces

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Establishment of the United States Army Civil Affairs Branch*, General Orders No.29, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006).

at the tactical level. Generally, the brigade does not directly support strategic level organizations but supports and enables special operations forces and sub-unified theater headquarters. At the theater-strategic level, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade's deploys Civil-Military Support Elements to U.S. embassies in order to assess partner nation capacity to develop and sustain governance and local institutions in support of the Geographic Combatant Commander's Theater Campaign Plan.

In 2011 a second active duty brigade, the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, is activating to meet the increased demand for civil affairs forces. To be based out of Fort Hood, TX, the brigade will consist of five battalions with six companies each. This brigade, is considered a General Purpose Forces, not special operations, and will be assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command to support Army Service Component Commands and other conventional forces. It is unclear if the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade's Civil-Military Support Element mission will expand to non-special operations civil affairs units like the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade. Other than the conventional nature of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade's mission, its employment will be similar to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade.

Active duty Civil Affairs officers are assigned throughout the Army at Brigades, Divisions, and Corps staffs as S-9s, G-9s, and, during deployment as J-9s (civil-military operations staff officers). In this role they are considered part of the conventional Army. Very few serve at the joint level and thus able to impact strategic level planning. Only when assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade are they regarded as special operations officers.

With 90% of civil affairs forces, or approximately 12,000 soldiers, in the Army Reserve, 216 companies, battalions, brigades and commands report to the United States

Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) located at Fort Bragg, NC. This two-star headquarters in turn reports to the United States Army Reserve Command, part of U.S. Forces Command, and is considered a general purpose, or conventional force. This headquarters is not considered a deployable headquarters.

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command is composed of four geographically aligned Civil Affairs Commands. Each Civil Affairs Command is deployable and geographically aligned to a Geographic Combatant Commander.³⁹ As of 2011, there are eight brigades and 28 battalions with planned increases of five battalions each comprised of four companies.⁴⁰ All of the civil affairs brigades are deployable and normally align at the theater strategic or operational levels. The battalions are tactically focused. These brigades and battalions remain heavily deployed to the Southwest Asia Theater in support of joint and combined combat operations.⁴¹


Civil affairs units provide support based on the levels of war, as illustrated in Figure 2-1. The bulk of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps civil affairs units are tactical level battalions and below. Civil affairs brigades, active and reserve, provide support to the operational and theater-strategic levels of operations.

³⁹ The 353rd Civil Affairs Command is aligned to two Geographic Combatant Commanders, European Command and Africa Command.

⁴⁰ There are two additional Army Reserve General Purpose Force civil affairs brigades that do not report to the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the 322nd and the 361st Civil Affairs Brigades. The former is assigned to US Army Pacific (USARPAC) in Hawaii and does not command subordinate battalions. The latter is a US Army Europe (USAREUR) asset, based in Germany with one subordinate battalion. To date, these units have not deployed in support of combat operations.

⁴¹ Reserve forces are limited in their active duty commitment with a one-year mobilized period followed by five years in a demobilized status. Within the Army Reserve, Civil Affairs units are exceeding that standard with approximately 20 months demobilized for every 12 months mobilized. Active duty forces, by contrast, work to achieve a one year deployed and a two year period at home station.

Figure 2-1 Civil Affairs Forces Support to the Levels of War⁴²



As depicted in Figure 2-1, the Civil Affairs Commands are the only units designed to provide strategic level support to Geographic Combatant Commanders. Due to their nature, these units are limited in their ability to support the strategic level by four constraints: First, there are only four Civil Affairs Commands; Second, they are only found in the Army Reserve; Third, as reserve units, each Civil Affairs Commands can be mobilized for up to 400 days at a time allowing approximately nine months of deployment after completion of required pre-deployment training; and Fourth, there is an individual-level training and education gap in the ability to adequately assist the planning and execution of civil-military operations actions. This will be further explored in Chapter Three.

⁴² Adapted from U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.40, 1-6.

With 514 personnel, just over one-half (312) in the reserves, the Marine Corps civil affairs force is structured for conventional tactical support.⁴³ The Marine Corps has two permanent civil affairs units both in the reserves: the 3rd Civil Affairs Group, based at Camp Pendleton, CA, in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and the 4th Civil Affairs Group, based at Naval Support Facility Anacostia, in support of II Marine Expeditionary Force. Typical deployment of reserve civil affairs is at the team level with tactical units. Active duty civil affairs Marines typically serve at the tactical and operational level as staff for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and smaller units with a very limited number of civil affairs teams.

The Navy also has a small conventional, tactically focused, civil affairs force. The Navy Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command is currently composed of a mix of active duty and reservists occupying 330 civil affairs billets focused on the littoral and harbor areas. The command will reduce to 227 billets as part of the larger Navy force drawdown.⁴⁴ Of these billets, approximately 60% will remain active duty with the rest assigned to the reserves.

The Air Force does not have civil affairs units, positions, or personnel. At one time Air Force Judge Advocate General officers attended the Army civil affairs course to provide civil affairs specific guidance to commanders. That is no longer the case. The Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence at Nellis AFB, as a component of the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center, is charged with facilitating development of

⁴³ U.S. Marine Corps, Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, “SCETC Update Brief to Civil Affairs Association,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Arlington, VA, Civil Affairs Association, January 29, 2011.

⁴⁴ *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, 12.

“innovative applications of U.S. Air Force airpower in irregular warfare.”⁴⁵ Air Force personnel served in civil affairs billets in Iraq and Afghanistan, in lieu of Army officers when severe personnel shortages impacted operations. The Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center is working to identify personnel who were assigned to these positions to award a Special Experience Identifier.⁴⁶ This may allow assignment to civil affairs positions if the future need arises.

The DoD reported to Congress that it “is evaluating the requirement for a dedicated joint civil affairs planning capability within each Geographical Combatant Command.”⁴⁷ This suggests that the J-9 staff, previously mentioned as serving on the Geographic Combatant Commanders staffs, are not sufficient in their numbers or planning capabilities to serve as civil-military operations planners. Rather, additional planning capabilities are required.

This summation of military civil affairs forces is not all inclusive of U.S. government capabilities in this area. The Department of State is the lead agency, per National Security Policy Directive-44, for stability operations. In view of requirements contained therein, the Department of State established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability and continues to develop its capabilities and scope. Other U.S. government agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development, have complementary development, security, stability, transition, and reconstruction capabilities that can support or lead operations.

⁴⁵ U.S. Air Force Warfare Center, “Warfare Center Fact Sheet,” <http://www.nellis.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4082> (accessed 17 Nov 10).

⁴⁶ *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs*, 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

Clearly, the vast majority of civil affairs forces are allocated and trained for the tactical level with a more limited force structure at the operational level. Only four units are designed to serve at the strategic level and augment the capabilities at the Geographic Combatant Commander. However, these units are assigned to the Army Reserves and limited in their ability to impact operations due to the mobilization cycle.

This chapter reviewed the operating terms relevant to civil affairs and civil-military operations, analyzed the application of civil affairs within the international and national level legal and policy requirements, and finally, the civil affairs force structures in the Army, Navy, and Marines from the viewpoint of their application to the levels of war. Although technically background discussions to frame further discussion, the chapter also served to bring to the forefront issues with outdated laws and policy and lack of structure suitable for engaging at the strategic level of JIIM operations.

Chapter 3 - Civil Affairs Training and Education Programs

This chapter examines the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps' educational development of civil affairs officers. Despite working in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment most of the time, each service has its own institution designed to train basic civil affairs skills with each school essentially teaching an identical basic level curriculum. In an era of constrained resources it does not make sense for services to duplicate efforts instructing the same basic skills. The Department of Defense (DoD) found it necessary to deal with a similar problem in military intelligence. The solution was to name the Air Force executive agent for the defense intelligence community with responsibility for joint military intelligence instruction. Service specific training is conducted as required for follow-on assignments. A similar solution may be necessary for the civil affairs specialty.

Each civil affairs training institution asserts the need to develop service specific skill sets that in practice amount to a few modules of instruction. Each school also focuses on the tactical level without opportunity for additional developmental educational opportunities to expand knowledge, skills, and abilities at the operational and strategic levels. While it is appropriate that entry level civil affairs officers begin their careers with tactical level training it must not be the final career field course of study.

The 1987 Defense Authorization Act contained a rider, the Nunn-Cohen Act of 1987, establishing U.S. Special Operations Command as the unified combatant commander for special operations. This authority, contained in Section 167 of U.S. Code Title X, designated civil affairs a “Special Operations Activity.” U.S. Special Operations Command is therefore responsible for developing strategy, doctrine and “[m]onitoring

the promotions, assignments, retention, ***training, and professional military education*** of special operations forces officers.”¹ The purpose of professional military education “is to develop military officers, throughout their careers, for the rigorous intellectual demands of complex contingencies and major conflicts.”² The purpose of this educational preparation “is to educate officers throughout their careers...for this unique public trust.”³

There is an important distinction between training and education. Training is “focused on the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and task.”⁴ Education, on the other hand, builds “general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors... and fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives, critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems.”⁵ Properly developed educational programs develop a depth of knowledge resulting from a combination of study and experience.

The interplay among military and civilian education and assignments and experience is essential to developing beyond basic skill sets. Civil affairs must seek out, what the incoming Chief of Staff of the Army describes as, “an educational foundation that enables creative and critical thinking in an environment of complexity, ambiguity

¹ United States, 10 U.S.C. § 167 : US Code - Section 167: Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, paragraphs (e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(J) and (j)(5), <http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/10/A/I/6/167> (accessed December 5, 2010), Emphasis added by the author.

² U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 2010), VII.

³ *Ibid.*, XI.

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff Instruction 1801.01D, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), A-2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, A-1.

and uncertainty.”⁶ Civil affairs officers work with foreign militaries and civilian agencies with oversight of complex problems that require abilities gained through progressive education in combination with a diverse mix of assignments. The defense intelligence community while facing the need for joint training, discussed earlier, found itself dealing with a similar need for progressive education. Their solution was to provide bachelor’s and master’s degrees in intelligence related studies to the services and the wider intelligence community.

In order to properly address the need for strategically educated JIIM civil affairs professionals, the issue of where proponency is assigned must be briefly discussed further. U.S. Special Operations Command has Title X responsibility for civil affairs yet the majority of Army civil affairs forces are assigned as general purposes forces and no longer subordinate to U.S. Special Operations Command.⁷ Adding to the confusion the Navy and Marine Corps have civil affairs units that are general purposes forces and have their own civil affairs training institutions. How can a joint proponent, effectively and efficiently, exercise its Title X responsibilities when it commands a small fraction of the civil affairs units, provides training only to Army civil affairs, and then only at the tactical level without subsequent continuing education?⁸


In the military, there is interplay between promotions, education, and jobs. Promotions are tied to the level of success in a variety of jobs and meeting certain

⁶ Martin E. Dempsey, "Building Critical Thinkers: Leader Development Must Be the Army's Top Priority," *Armed Forces Journal* 148, no. 7 (February 2011), 14.

⁷ The fact that the majority of civil affairs forces are in the U.S. Army Reserves and considered conventional, rather than special operation forces, raises questions and much discussion: Should these units be designated Special Operations or General Purpose Force? Who should be the proponent, USSOCOM or a conventional headquarters? Who should provide their training? Although these are fascinating questions and deserve further investigation, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

⁸ Army civil affairs training is provided through the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Figure 3-1 Civil Affairs Career Progression Model⁹



* Area orientation is helpful but not required. Language training is not a requisite skill.

** Field Grade Officers should attend JPME II course prior to being assigned to joint staff positions.

minimum levels of military and civilian education. Figure 3-1 highlights the process for Army civil affairs officers, at lower ranks, a bachelor's degree is the minimum civilian education for promotion to Major. For higher ranks a master's degree is the expected civilian educational attainment. Military education is also progressive throughout a

⁹ Adapted from information presented in U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management Personnel-General*, DA Pam 600-3, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2010) and U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, DA Pam 611-21, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007).

Acronyms: GCC-Geographic Combatant Command; ASCC: Army Service Component Command; ASOC: United States Army Special Operations Command; CTC: Combat Training Center; HRC: Human Resources Command; SWCS: US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School; HQDA: Headquarters Department of the Army; CACOM: Civil Affairs Command; USACAPOC(A): US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command; USARSO: US Army South/6th US Army; USPACOM: US Pacifica Command; SOUTHCOM: US Southern Command; CENTCOM: US Central Command; SOCOM: US Special Operations Command; ASD SO/LIC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict.

military career. In the Army this begins with the Basic Officer Leadership Course and culminates at the Senior Service College level. The civil affairs course is normally taught to junior Captains and that is the limit of their military educational exposure to the subject.

When discussing the type of jobs an Army civil affairs officer can expect it is likely to begin at the tactical level. As an officer increases in rank the opportunity for operational and strategic level joint jobs becomes more likely. A civil affairs officer can expect assignment to strategic level jobs upon promotion to Major. At this point an officer may be assigned to a Civil Affairs Planning Team, a Geographic Combatant Command or the Joint Staff.


As an organizational investment in the future of the military and the individual involved it is important to examine the availability of civil affairs training and education programs. Lower level military courses are intended to train specific job skills while higher level military schools target officer education. For civil affairs officers, strategic level military education becomes significant at the rank of Major/Lieutenant Commander due to assignment opportunities, yet at this level they can expect to attend intermediate level education that is oriented on operational level skills.

Service Civil Affairs Training Institutions

The Army Special Warfare Center is responsible for training civil affairs officers for both special operation forces and general purposes forces. As described in Chapter Two these officers include a relatively small active duty group with the preponderance of forces from the reserve components. The active component officers are largely destined for assignment to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade which is considered special operations.

Reserve component officers will serve in one of the many battalion, brigade, or Civil Affairs Commands as general purpose forces.

Figure 3-2 Active Component Initial Acquisition Training Pipeline¹⁰



Active duty officers in training for civil affairs attend a lengthy course composed of civil affairs training, language development, and cultural education. Figure 3-2 illustrates the active component's civil affairs training pipeline. Phase I, Introduction to Civil Affairs, is delivered by distributed learning at the officer's home station. The second, and subsequent phases, are taught at Fort Bragg, NC in residence. Phase II is between 19 and 25 weeks in length, depending on the difficulty of the foreign language assigned, and combined with cultural instruction as dictated by the language. Upon completion of language training, resulting in a basic listening and reading comprehension level, the officer begins civil affairs training in earnest for the next 13 weeks covering diverse topics including civil affairs core competencies, adaptive thinking and leadership, and planning skills. Upon completion of this phase the student is sent to a field


¹⁰ Adapted from briefing slides provided by Major Glenn Anderson, USAR Division Chief (CA and MISO), Directorate of Special Operations Proprietary (DSOP), U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, February 28, 2011.

environment for three weeks of practical application training at the tactical level.

Typically, upon graduation the officer is assigned as a Civil Affairs Team Leader.

Reserve component officers, by contrast, are given an entire year to complete approximately five weeks of training delivered exclusively by distributed learning. For the most part the curriculum mirrors the topics delivered to the active duty officers. The second phase is delivered in residence by instructors at Fort Bragg, NC over the course of four weeks and includes class work as well as practical application exercises in a field environment. Upon graduation, the students return to their Army Reserve civil affairs units.

Figure 3-3 Reserve Component Initial Acquisition Training Pipeline¹¹



The content of the active and reserve courses is roughly comparable in civil affairs content and practical applications exercises in the field. However, there is much debate about the effectiveness and merit of a curriculum delivered largely via distributed learning. Are reserve officers shortchanged by this method of delivery? Also, the reserve curriculum lacks training in foreign languages and culture. This may have the cumulative

¹¹ Ibid.

effect of making the reserve officers lesser trained, and therefore, second class citizens within the civil affairs community.

Despite the fact that the Army considers civil affairs a career branch there is not a civil affairs advanced level skills course taught at the Army Special Warfare Center for further professional development. Additionally, the courses have the ever important planning component embedded in the curriculum but it remains focused on the tactical level. The Army Special Warfare Center has no further professional military education aimed at the civil affairs professional.

As of early 2010, the Navy sent officers to the Army civil affairs training course at Fort Bragg, NC in preparation for service in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. These naval officers served in billets the Army could not fill. With the organization of a naval civil affairs unit the Navy established its own civil affairs course. Those trained bring new civil affairs functional skills to include: harbor and channel maintenance/ construction, marine and fisheries resources and management, international law/law of the sea, and public health.¹² These skills are nested in the Navy civil affairs course curriculum and reflect the Navy's maritime focus and traditions.

The Navy civil affairs officer serves a single two year tour in the specialty before returning to their primary military occupation. The officer students are trained in a course focused on a pre-determined deployment and then deploy for a single tour before returning to their primary Navy career field. This impacts the development of skills beyond a basic level of understanding. Without a career field program there is no

¹² U.S. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, "Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Fact Sheet," <http://www.necc.navy.mil/> (accessed March 9, 2011).

opportunity to develop a deep understanding of language, culture, and civil affairs tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be further developed and applied at the strategic level.

Due to its size, the Navy Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command is limited in its capabilities, and with its separate training pipeline focused only on maritime aspects of civil affairs, it is not fully inter-changeable with Army and Marine Corps civil affairs units. As an unintended consequence, Geographic Combatant Commanders assign Navy Civil Affairs units to missions, such as Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, that unintentionally take them out of their familiar operating environment and place them into areas normally assigned to Army civil affairs. Navy civil affairs forces are not adequately trained for land based operations yet the Geographic Combatant Commanders expect civil affairs forces to be interchangeable.

As recently as 2009, the Marine Corps also used the Army civil affairs course to train its civil affairs officers. In that same year, the Marine Corps established its own four-week civil affairs training course. Marine officers graduating from the course are awarded civil affairs as a secondary military occupational skill. Most of these Marines are reservists assigned to one of two Civil Affairs Groups. There are now 202 active duty Marine Corps civil affairs positions assigned to Marine Expeditionary Units, regiments, and Marine Expeditionary Forces in civil-military operations staff planner positions and civil affairs teams.

These Marine units are focused on the tactical through operational levels of operations, not the strategic level, in keeping with the Marine Corps' focus. As a newly formed secondary Military Occupational Skill it is presumed that these officers will

return to their primary career field and will not appreciably develop civil affairs skills beyond the basic, tactical level.

Developing a Strategic Level Civil-Military Operations Planner

The issue with service oriented civil affairs school houses is their lack of opportunities for advanced education, lack of jointness, and tactical focus that do not evolve experiences gained at the tactical and operational level into strategic level skills. Critics are quick to point out that the normal progression of professional military education is attendance at one of the services' intermediate level education institutions. These organizations, however, are designed to broaden and cultivate basic tactical level military planning skills into service specific operational level competence. Due to the nature of their assignments and deployments many civil affairs officers are already experienced at the operational level. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the DoD to develop a program that guides officer progression to a higher level. Four such programs are identified below.

Certificate in Strategic Planning for International Stabilization and Recovery

In coordination with senior civil affairs leadership, the Public Administration department at James Madison University developed a course of study with a high likelihood of achieving a strategic minded civil affairs officer. This inter-disciplinary graduate certificate in Strategic Planning for International Stabilization and Recovery is a 15 semester hour program of study intended to develop skills to assist civilian populations and government entities affected by military operations. The coursework includes classes in Strategic Planning in World Affairs, Governance and Stabilization, Community and Economic Development, Strategic Planning and Management, and

Strategic Cross-Cultural Communication. This coursework is designed specifically to provide strategic skill development for civil affairs officers.¹³ While this course is another tool for developing civil affairs officers, it does not provide recognized professional military education credit. In view of the precedent established by certification of the Naval Postgraduate School program, (see next section) award of professional military education credit may be feasible in the near future.

Certificate in Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations

At the request of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the Naval Postgraduate School, in conjunction with the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, Army War College, and Naval War College, established a Master's certificate in Stability Security, and Development in Complex Operations specifically for the civil affairs community. This program uses the Army's intermediate level education (three-month in-residence or distributed learning programs) common core as a basis. The certificate program is then taken through the Naval Postgraduate School in lieu of the Advanced Operations Course.

The Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations certificate program is delivered via a mix of distributed learning and in-residence periods and seeks to professionalize civil affairs officers by enhancing their ability to plan and execute complex operations.¹⁴ The program objectives include developing an understanding of stability, security and development in the global context through case studies and development of assessment and planning tools for complex operations

¹³ James Madison University, "James Madison University Graduate Catalogue, 2010-2011," <http://www.jmu.edu/gradcatalog/10/programs/puad.html#certificate2> (accessed March 5, 2001).

¹⁴ U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Global Public Policy Academic Group, *Certificate in Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations Syllabus*, (Monterey, CA: Department of the Navy, n.d.), 4.

fostering strategic development.¹⁵ Finally, this coursework provides certification for strategic civil affairs practitioners in complex operations. Completion of the course completes the Army's intermediate level professional military education.

Master of Arts in Global Interagency Studies

Although not developed specifically for civil affairs officers, the University of Kansas, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, organized a "Global Interagency Studies" concentration in the Global and International Studies master's program. Developed and funded, at the request of the United States Special Operations Command, the program is intended for special operations officers, to include civil affairs officers. Successful completion of the graduate program confers a Master of Arts degree. The coursework consists of 33 semester credit hours, with six credits for the Army Intermediate Level Education program and 27 credits from University of Kansas courses.¹⁶ This cooperative program provides an avenue for determined civil affairs officers to obtain a master's degree while expanding their strategic skills and abilities.

Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies

At the Senior Service College level, the National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs developed a 35 semester credit hour Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies to develop "a strategic perspective on the global threat environment, the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements, the relationship between political objectives, strategy, all instruments of national power, and

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ University of Kansas, "Master's Degree in Global and International Studies Global Interagency Studies Track," http://www.opmge.ku.edu/interagency_studies.shtml (accessed March 5, 2001).

the roles of power and ideology.”¹⁷ This master’s degree offers five concentrations with International Security Studies and Conflict Management of Stability Operations¹⁸ as perhaps the most pertinent to the civil affairs officer’s developmental needs. The program is designed to prepare professionals “to develop and implement national and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis, and war.”¹⁹

Certainly, other military and civilian education courses and programs of study are applicable to developing strategic minded civil-military operations planners at numerous military and civilian institutions. The critical point in this section is that civil affairs must use programs like these, or develop their own, if they are to remain relevant as a strategic instrument of national power.

Functional Specialties

Chapter Two notes that civil affairs functional specialties support strategic level civil affairs operations. At the Civil Affairs Command level civil affairs core functions are directly aligned with civil affairs functional specialty cells.²⁰ Figure 3-4 is designed to demonstrate disconnects between civil affairs functional specialty cells and the skill identifiers the Army uses to denote certification of a certain skill set. Civil affairs functional positions should be occupied by trained and certified civil affairs specialists but not all functional specialties have a corresponding identifier denoting at least minimum levels of specialized knowledge.

¹⁷ National Defense University, “Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies,” <http://www.ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?secID=559&pageID=121&type=section> (accessed March 5, 2011).

¹⁸ Other concentrations include Counterterrorism, Homeland Security Strategy and Leadership, and Homeland Defense.

¹⁹ National Defense University, “Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies.”

²⁰ See Annex A for a breakdown of civil affairs functional specialty cells at the battalion, brigade, and command levels.

Figure 3-4 Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cell Cross Walk to Skill Identifiers




Figure 3-4 demonstrates inconsistencies between the functional specialty cells and the functional specialties themselves that should be corrected. First, each functional skill should be present in one or more functional specialty. As illustrated above, that is not the case. Archivists and Civil Defense Officers are not found in the functional specialty cells of Civil Affairs Commands nor brigades or battalions. A further analysis indicates that the Archivist skill identifier is not attached to any civil affairs position.²¹ The Civil Defense Officer identifier has been characterized as only existing for a very few positions in battalion and brigade operations offices. On the other hand, the Public Health functional specialty does not have a corresponding functional specialty skill. The Army Special Warfare Center, as the civil affairs proponent, should remedy this issue by

²¹ Major Glenn Anderson, USAR Division Chief (CA and MISO), Directorate of Special Operations Propriety (DSOP), U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, February 28, 2011.

establishing one or more skill identifiers for each functional area and eliminate unnecessary “orphan” skill identifiers. U.S. Special Operations Command, as the joint proponent for civil affairs, should expand functional designations to the civil affairs community across the services. As previously noted, the Navy developed and recognizes maritime focused civil affairs functional specialties but training is tailored to include instruction in these areas only as needed for pending missions.²²

Figure 3-5 demonstrates the lack of skills needed to gain a civil affairs functional specialty skill identifier. There is an issue with the level of skills needed to be awarded a skill identifier. As it stands, a skill identifier may be gained through experience, education, or certification but the threshold is very low. By way of illustration, the Civilian Supply Officer is responsible to advise in the administration, storage, and distribution of consumer goods and commodities. Qualification can be gained by possessing a bachelor’s degree in economics or business administration or five years experience in food or product distribution systems management. It is doubtful that these skill sets qualify a civil affairs officer to work at the strategic level advising a foreign government how to set up a supply chain at the provincial or national level. Each skill identifier has a similar disconnect between the duty description and the qualification levels that must be gained to be awarded the functional designator.

²² The four Navy Civil Affairs functional specialties are Harbor and channel maintenance/construction, Marine and fisheries resources and management, International law/law of the sea, and Public health.

Table 3-5 Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Qualification Comparison Matrix²³

	Job Description	Required Education	Experience	Certification
Civil Defense Officer	Analyzes, plans, implements, and manages indigenous emergency service assets in preparation for conduct of civil defense or disaster relief operations	Completion Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) independent study or a bachelor's degree in Emergency or Disaster Mgmt	Or experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director	Or Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) by Int'l Association of Emergency Managers
Economist/Commerce Officer	Analyzes, assesses, plans and implements economic, industrial, financial, business, and agricultural programs and policies to enhance the development of Allied Host nations	Masters degree in economics, finance, international business, or business administration	Or minimum of 5 years civilian experience in economics, banking, public finance, or foreign/ domestic development or a related field	None
Public Education Officer	Evaluates current educational systems and provides guidance to foreign nation agencies responsible for administration of indigenous educational institutions	Masters degree in education administration or education with an emphasis on school administration or vocational education	Or 5 years civilian experience in either public or private school district administration, or state/national department of education activities	None
Civilian Supply Officer	Advises in administration, storage, and distribution of consumer goods and commodities	Bachelor degree in economics or business administration	Or 5 years experience in food or product distribution systems management	None
Public Transportation Officer	Evaluates, categorizes, rehabilitates, and mobilizes development and operation of civilian transport assets and facilities	Bachelor degree in civil engineering or transportation	Or experience in mgmt or design of trans systems; or 3 years experience in the development of plans and policy at the state or national Department of Transportation level	None
Public Facilities Officer	Identifies and assesses capability, rehabilitation, development, and operational supervision of Public Works and Utilities	Bachelor degree in "civil, electrical, mechanical, waste, or water management engineering	Or 5 years experience in either management, design, or operation of public or private works and utilities	None
Public Safety Officer	Advise, assist, supervise, and control development, rehabilitation, and sustainment of police administration, fire protection, penal institutions, and emergency rescue services	Bachelor degree in criminology, fire science, police science, corrections management, or public administration	Or 3 years experience in supervisory or management position in government related public safety field or equivalent private industry position	None
Public Communications Officer	Advises in telecommunications engineering, network architecture and technical expertise to assess capability, rehabilitation, systems analysis, development planning, and operational oversight/supervision of public and private communications technologies, assets and facilities	Bachelor degree in Electronic or Electrical Engineering, communications management, or computer science	Or 5 years civilian experience in engineering or management in public or private comms position to include radio, television, postal service or automated data processing network	None
Agricultural Officer	Advises civilian production, processing, storage, and distribution of food, fiber, and wood products and development and management of resources essential to these activities	Bachelor degree in an agricultural discipline	Or 5 years experience in an agricultural related profession	None
Cultural Affairs Officer	Evaluates and preserves socio-religious arts, artifacts, monuments, shrines and other physical manifestations of culture and institutions	Professional knowledge or experience with ethnography, culture, sociology, institutions, and religious heritage	None	None
Archivist	Recovers, appraises safe-guards and disposes of public documents and records	Bachelor degree in library science, political science, or history	Or 5 years equivalent practical training in one or more of such fields	None

²³ Adapted from U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*.

The skill identifier for Civil Defense Officer appears to have the strongest connection between “job description” (analyzes, plans, implements, and manages indigenous emergency service assets in preparation for conduct of civil defense or disaster relief operations) and “required education” (completion of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s independent study or a bachelor’s degree in Emergency or Disaster Management), “experience” (experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director) and “certification” (Certified Emergency Manager by the International Association of Emergency Managers). The Army Special Warfare Center should strive to strengthen all skill identifiers to this level, at a minimum.

As a possible remedy to this situation, the Army Special Warfare Center should establish, or identify, training courses for each skill identifier. These courses should use the current functional area experience requirements as prerequisites and then supply additional training necessary to operationalize functional specialties for employment at the strategic level. Once updated prerequisites and a suitable training course are the norm then the Army Special Warfare Center should establish certification testing for each skill identifier. This testing may be developed internally but the skills certification would be seen as more legitimate if gained through a recognized national or international civilian association or institute.

In 2004, the Army identified the need for a civil-military operations planner skill set and certain positions were then code for the prerequisite. The Army Special Warfare Center developed requirements and implemented a skill identifier for a “Civil-Military Operations Planner.” This identifier was designed for civil affairs officers assigned to “above the line units” including Army Service Component Commands, Geographic Combatant Commanders, and the Joint Staff. See Figure 4-6. Deleted in 2008, due to

additional training embedded in the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course, officers rarely requested the identifier and gaining commands did not demand it as a prerequisite for personnel assignments. An analysis of the civil-military operations planning training module in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course concludes that the training is focused on the tactical level.

Table 3-6 Civil Military Operations Planner Qualification²⁴

Title	Job Description	Required Education	Experience	Certification
Civil-Military Operations Planner	Advise commander on all CA issues in non-CA unit staff position(s) requiring the ability to advise, assist, supervise, and coordinate CA military operations and CA operations in support of conventional and special operations forces	Possess a baccalaureate degree and graduate from the CA Officer Qualification Course	or 3 years practical experience in a leadership, supervisory or management position involving government, administration, public safety, construction, and public health	None

Three items stand out in this example: at one time the Army, identified the need for a civil-military operations planner specific skill set; it identified school trained personnel and units and positions at the operational or strategic level requiring a trained civil-military operations planner; and the requirements to be awarded the skill identifier were weak, lacking specificity and appropriate certification. It is probable that these were among the reasons that the skill identifier was not valued by individuals or units and therefore fell into disuse and was eliminated.

Despite the fact that the Navy and Marine Corps civil affairs forces are small, in comparison to the Army's civil affairs corps, they each have duplicative and overlapping educational institutions focused on the same training goals. Each of the services' schools

²⁴ Adapted from U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*.

are focused on the tactical level and do not offer further educational development that would expand an officer's ability to serve at the strategic level as a civil-military operations planner and subject matter expert. Service intermediate level education is insufficient due to the need for specialized civil affairs specific skills. Educational alternatives are found in civilian institutions and some are currently used. The Army's civil affairs functional specialties are strategically focused but lack specificity in prerequisites without military training available to expand their utility. The value of a civil-military operations planner is recognized, but when put into practice it was poorly executed and fell into disuse. These civil affairs educational issues and their impact on civil-military planning will be addressed in Chapter Four.

Chapter 4 - Recommendations

The National Security Strategy observed “in the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it.”¹ As part of the national security apparatus, the Department of Defense (DoD) must shape its civil affairs forces and its ability to plan and conduct civil-military operations. The following recommendations, based on previously stated problems and discussion as shaped by law and historical perspective, can serve to advance civil affairs and the state of civil-military operations planning.

Recommendation #1: Establish a Chief of Civil Affairs to advocate for civil affairs and civil-military operations.

Discussion: To this point, the author does not explicitly state that there is a civil affairs leadership gap within DoD. However, from the paucity of civil affairs and civil-military operations direction and deficiencies described in coordinating authority and integration with the inter-agency, it is clear there is a serious leadership vacuum at senior levels. Perhaps the best option available to positively impact success in civil-military operations planning and execution is to establish a general officer position to coordinate OSD actions with the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) community at strategic levels of operations.

The Army is the only service with general officers in and from the civil affairs specialty. These civil affairs general officers are Army Reservists serving as commanders of reserve civil affairs forces or as staff officers. Notably, some of these officers are in an

¹ *National Security Strategy*, 9.

active duty status and positioned in influential positions such as: Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs Africa in the Joint Staff J5; Deputy Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa; and Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). Recently, the U.S. Army selected the first active duty civil affairs officer for promotion to Brigadier General. He is now the deputy commander of the Army Special Warfare Center.²

There is no specific staff section on the Joint Staff that advocates for civil affairs or civil-military operations actions. Placing a civil affairs general officer at the joint level sends a powerful signal about the importance of the specialty and the DoD's commitment to civil-military operations while providing a national level military coordinator and synchronizer for civil affairs and civil-military operations actions. The position, as described, is analogous to the role of the Army's Chief of Engineers, serving as an advocate and coordinator for the Army's engineering activities. A similar civil affairs position on the Joint Staff should serve as the single DoD point of contact for all civil-military operations related activities.

The Army has the vast majority of civil affairs forces. The author recommends the Army investigate placing a civil affairs general officer on the Department of the Army staff. The duties should include, but not be limited to, coordination of civil-military operations activities among the Joint Staff and civil affairs units. This would serve to reemphasize the Army's dedication to the importance of civil affairs and civil-military operations.

² Colonel (P) Ferdinand Irizarry II received that promotion selection and assignment.

A general officer serving as an advocate for civil affairs can continue to evolve civil affairs education and development. The ability to provide strategic level vision coupled with the planning, coordination, and execution at the service and joint levels are compelling gains to capabilities within the civil affairs corps and the DoD. If it is not possible to place a general officer on the Joint Staff, OSD should investigate appointing the Department of the Army as executive agent for civil affairs and civil-military operations.

Pros:

- Establishes a single point of contact for civil affairs and civil-military operations actions at the joint and strategic levels.
- Improves the ability to guide the development of joint civil affairs training and education.
- Provides a node for direct support to civil-military operations planning by effectively integrating with JIIM partners.

Cons:

- The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has announced his intent to cut 100 General and Flag officers, shrink the size of the Army and Marine Corps, and reduce budgets.³ This makes it difficult to justify adding one or more general officers. However, this is potentially an important increase in capabilities at the service and joint levels in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. While less optimal, a viable option might be to dual-hat the commander of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command with duty on the Army staff.

³ "Track Four Efficiency Decisions," 23-30.

Recommendation #2: Establish Civil Affairs Staff Support Elements at the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders levels to act as the civil affairs and civil-military operations experts throughout the spectrum of operations.

Discussion: In concert with, and nested under, the recommendation to establish a Chief of Civil Affairs, there must also be a concomitant establishment of a staff to orchestrate the issues related to civil affairs development and support of civil-military operations.

The Joint Staff requires civil affairs staff members who are able to develop and implement strategic actions involving laws, policies, education and employment of civil-military operations. The Geographic Combatant Commanders already have a stated requirement for J9 civil-military operations staff to support their J5 ability to develop comprehensive Theater Campaign Plans, Contingency Plans, and Operations Plans. This augmentation can provide specially trained professionals with the ability and capacity to plan and integrate achievable effects through civil-military operations. In the execution phase of operations, this additional staff structure can better support J3 ability to execute civil-military operations.

Pros:

- A dedicated staff of trained civil affairs officers will lead to better planned, integrated, and executed Theater Campaign Plans, Contingency Plans, and Operations Plans in the area of civil-military operations.
- An available staff of civil affairs officers will enable the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders to better execute civil-military operations in coordination with inter-agency partners.

Cons:

- As previously noted, the Secretary of Defense intends to shrink the size of the Army and Marine Corps and reduce budgets. His cost cutting measures will not spare headquarters staffs. A possible alternative is to reprogram civilian and military positions through personnel efficiencies gained by combining civil affairs training institutions.

Recommendation #3: Establish a Civil Affairs Center of Excellence to function as a joint civil affairs/civil-military operations training center.

Discussion: Establishment of a civil affairs “center of excellence” allows nesting the prior recommendations for a jointly conducted initial accession civil affairs course, management of civil affairs focused intermediate level education initiatives, and management of functional specialty training and certification under the control of a single institution. The Army has demonstrated success with this concept including the establishment of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA which enabled the combined education of its Infantry and Armor schools. The students gain from a diversity of instructors and the overhead of two, or more, schools is consolidated into one headquarters.

A center of excellence can be accommodated under a variety of institutions. U.S. Special Operations Command, as the joint proponent for civil affairs, has the responsibility to develop and provide training and doctrine development for the joint special operation force and maintains two relevant training organizations: the Joint Special Operations University which serves as its joint and strategic school house; and the Army Special Warfare Center which trains, among other specialties, civil affairs. Additionally, the Army Training and Doctrine Command is a large military training

institution with capabilities to stand up and train a variety of skills. The author is not recommending one institution over the other, but various options are available. The most important factor is the development of professional military education leading to strategic civil affairs planners.

Pros:

- Consolidation of schools and education oversight can be expected to increase the likelihood of producing high quality civil-military operations planners for the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders.
- Consolidation of efforts will lead to economies of scale conserving scarce personnel and fiscal resources.
- A center of excellence will consolidate into one institution the initial accessions civil affairs course, the management of intermediate level civil affairs education, a civil-military operations planning course, and functional specialty training and certification,

Cons:

- Short Term, upfront costs of consolidating schools at one location, moving equipment and personnel. This may be offset by a reduction in long-term operating costs and the gain of important DoD capabilities.

The following proposals are nested within Recommendation #3:

Recommendation #4: Establish a joint civil affairs initial accessions course for all services.

Discussion: Developing a civil affairs initial accession course, attended by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps students, is needed to change the internal culture of the civil affairs force making it more jointly focused. This will enable JIIM planning, execution,

and interoperability beginning at the lowest levels in all services. Combining the civil affairs courses of three services will allow new officers to immediately develop critical joint skills with the added benefit of capitalizing on manpower and fiscal saving in a time of increasingly constrained resources.

Pros:

- Civil affairs forces will become interchangeable at the most basic tactical levels positively impacting the Geographic Combatant Commanders' options.
- Long-term savings from consolidating three schools into one may save manning and operational funds. Each service would supply qualified instructors in a manner similar to the military intelligence training field where the Air Force is the executive agent and provides instruction for the other services. The other services in turn, provide resources and personnel support.
- Increased likelihood of producing high quality, interoperable civil affairs officers as a long term investment.

Cons:

- Short-term, upfront costs of consolidating schools at one location incurred by moving equipment and personnel. This may be offset by the long-term savings in personnel and other resources.
- Requirement to integrate and standardize existing course curriculums. The Navy and Marine Corps requirements are based on the Army's curriculum. Coordination at the joint level can lead to an inter-service solution.
- May require development or adaptation of additional courses to meet service specific requirements. The defense intelligence community overcame this hurdle through

close inter-service coordination ensuring the majority of service specific training requirements were integrated into existing training.

Recommendation #5: Develop and implement a joint, intermediate level education civil affairs/civil-military operations planner course focused on the operational and strategic levels.

Discussion: The establishment of a joint, intermediate level course for civil affairs and civil-military operations practitioners will benefit commanders at the operational and strategic level. Normally, military students receive their intermediate level education at the junior O4 level but existing courses are not adapted to the specialized needs of civil affairs officers. Often, even the tactical operations undertaken by junior civil affairs officers have strategic impacts. In addition, unlike most other career fields these junior officers often work at strategic levels.

The Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations certificate at the Naval Postgraduate School is ideally suited to the needs of the civil affairs force. However, it is currently too small to accommodate the large number of students needing this type of education and is only routinely available to students from the Army Reserve.

Pros:

- Education programs at the Naval Postgraduate School and other institutions already exist. The extant proof of concept should be applicable on a much greater scale.
- Programs can become certified to provide professional military education credit to a wider group of officers. Joint education credit should be researched.
- Develops strategic level skills and understanding for relatively junior officers enabling them to impact planning and execution of civil-military operations.

- The Naval Postgraduate School is already jointly focused.

Cons:

- In an era of shrinking budgets upfront costs are a factor. A cost benefit analysis must demonstrate that the capability gained provides a satisfactory return on investment.
- Although the Army has already approved the course for intermediate level education other services may have to be convinced of the educational value. This can be addressed in a future version of the *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff Instruction 1801, by directing the services to engage the issue jointly.

Recommendation #6: Develop and implement a strategic-level Civil-Military Operations planner course for all services.

Discussion: Previously, the Army recognized the requirements for a skill identifier for a civil-military operations planner but no action has been taken. This is still necessary and development and implementation should be fast tracked. Implementation of this skill identifier cannot be seen as a standalone requirement. Rather, it should be accompanied by experience requirements in tandem with a specialized course to teach critical strategic level planning skills. Having proper certifications in hand, civil affairs positions at the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Command levels can be recoded and acquisition of the skill identifier can be mandatory prior to reporting for duty.

Pros:

- The civil affairs officer corps will be improved qualitatively and yield the needed capabilities.

- Training structure and facilities can be adapted from existing facilities at the Army Special Warfare Center, Joint Special Operations University, or other military education institution.

Cons:

- Will require development and implementation of an additional course. Prior course materials can be used as the starting point and existing civil affairs training development organizations can be directed to update the material to the required standard.
- As in other recommendations, upfront and operating costs are a factor. The educational course must be implemented in a cost conscious manner that ensures the benefits of the capability gained outweigh program costs.

Recommendation #7: Establish strategic functional civil affairs/civil-military operations skill training courses and certifications.

Discussion: Civil affairs has multiple strategic functional skill positions, however, the billets are not tied to stringent prerequisites or certification. The Army has eleven functional skills (see Figure 3-5 for duty descriptions and requirements to attain qualification) and the Navy has four, trained on an ad hoc basis per mission requirements. Marine Corps civil affairs is focused on the tactical level but increasing demand for civil-military operations may drive a change to the demand signal at the strategic level. While the Air Force does not have civil affairs forces, that does not negate the need for the skills found in functional civil affairs training courses. Civil affairs must establish rigorous experience and education requirements for each functional specialty. This may need to be further refined by coursework for military application at the strategic level. Finally,

certification, by a civilian institution, has considerable merit and can lend credibility to the specialty.

The Army must align its civil affairs functional specialty skill identifiers with personnel positions found in functional specialty cells. Functional specialty cells that do not have corresponding skill identifiers should be reviewed to determine if a capabilities gap exists that could be improved through addition of a functional specialty identifier and attendant training. Positions that are not in use, such as the Archivist functional specialty, should be eliminated. Appropriate level civilian skill sets must be certified and validated as a prerequisite for assignment to CA functional specialist billets.

Pros:

- Strengthens the strategic-level capabilities available to a Geographic Combatant Commander.
- Strengthens civil affairs functional specialty cell capabilities.
- Allows for establishment of specific certification criteria leading to a standardization of capabilities.

Cons:

- Requirement to develop and support additional courses and identify appropriate certification agencies. Existing civil affairs training development organizations can be tasked to develop suitable course material and execute required coordination with civilian certifying bodies.
- As in other recommendations, upfront and operating costs are a factor. The capability must be implemented in a manner that is not cost prohibitive and provide a clear gain in capabilities to the Geographic Combatant Commander.

These recommended solutions, if implemented, will enable civil affairs capabilities to evolve across service lines and increase development of civil affairs officers. This approach is designed to positively impact the planning of civil-military operations throughout the phases of operation, which in turn, will enable the execution of operations enabling success on the battlefield and in the hearts and minds of the people affected by military operations. The author believes that if the DoD is unable or unwilling to institute changes to civil affairs development, the specialty will wither and civil affairs will fail to positively impact the success of military operations.

Chapter 5 - Conclusions

The author defined and analyzed the background of civil affairs and civil-military operations in light of the current operational environment. The research examined terminology, laws, policies and regulations. It scrutinized Department of Defense (DoD) civil affairs force structure and training and education programs that demonstrate significant shortfalls for which alternate educational opportunities are available. The resulting recommendations have high potential to improve the ability of civil affairs to both remain a pertinent, strategic instrument of national military power and to significantly improve overall joint effectiveness at the strategic level.

Legal and policy requirements at the international and national levels require the DoD execute civil-military operations for both moral reasons and national self-interest considerations. In doing so, while civil-military operations are a command responsibility, conventional planners do not possess the required specialized training and experience of civil affairs specialists that may ensure success.

The research shows that there are serious training, education, and organizational issues. Civil affairs specialists are important: they offer skills that complement military operations and facilitate interaction with civilian by providing regional knowledge, cross-cultural awareness, and language skills. Due to their growing role as an integral component to military and whole of government success in pursuing and mitigating threats throughout the spectrum of operations, civil affairs and civil-military operations must be given better support.

Great strides can be made by addressing advocacy for the specialty, improving presence at the Geographic Combatant Commanders, updating organization and force

structure shortfalls and energizing training and education. This will revitalize the capabilities of the entire endeavor and transform the unique efforts of the individual services into a genuinely joint set of capabilities. Establishing a civil affairs general officer position, at the joint level, to advocate for civil affairs is crucial to ensure that the Army, Navy and Marine Corps focus on development of joint and strategic civil affairs and civil-military operations capabilities. This must be followed up with the establishment of civil affairs staff support elements at the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Command levels to act as the civil affairs and civil-military operations experts throughout the spectrum of operations.

Civil affairs force structures in the Army, Navy, and Marines are oriented on the tactical level while force structure focused on the strategic level is relatively smaller and lacks the additional training and education necessary to operate at that level. A civil affairs center of excellence can function as a joint civil affairs and civil-military operations training institute while addressing service specific needs for follow on training. Training must be expanded beyond the tactical level. A shared civil affairs initial accession training source that emphasizes the inherently joint nature of civil affairs begins to meet this goal while conserving valuable personnel and fiscal resources.

Education, not training, is the key to development beyond the tactical level to the operational and strategic level of civil-military operations planning. As officers progress in their careers they must have the ability to progress educationally to develop as operational and strategic level civil-military operations staff planners. A joint, intermediate level education option for civil affairs officers is a key component to evolving the specialty. When combined with a strategic level civil-military operations

planner course, and reformed functional civil affairs skills training courses and certifications, the opportunities for success are increased.

Civil-military operations staff structure augmentation at the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Command level staffs can leverage emerging planning capabilities for the execution of full spectrum operations. Civil affairs officers can serve as advocates at these levels to mission success.

This author's thesis is: For civil affairs to remain relevant as a strategic capability of military power, a new educational training model and certain structural changes must be developed, all in conjunction with expansion of relevant staff structures. This is essential to meet joint commanders' needs for a truly effective civil-military operations planning capability. Civil affairs capabilities can be further developed if the DoD is willing to implement a civil-military operations planning course and expand educational options to develop strategic civil affairs officers. This will have the effect of increasing the relevance of planning and executing civil-military operations. As indicated in this thesis, educational options abound that meet this need.

The current focus of U.S. government attention is firmly planted on the planning and operations in Southwest Asia where a sufficiently broad whole of government stability operation has yet to enable success. The ability of military planners and strategists to use and synchronize civil-military operations as an element of national military power is key. The ability to impact operations clearly depends on the knowledge, training, and education to plan civil-military operations at the joint, operational and strategic levels. Civil Affairs officers, enlisted personnel, and DoD civilians in this enterprise need to be competent at every level of joint, interagency,

intergovernmental, and multinational operations (JIIM). A case in point is the people and governments of Southwest Asia must be enabled to succeed and seize the initiative.


Since World War II, the Army has not comprehensively updated civil affairs capabilities in the joint operating environment. The world continues to evolve and the DoD must alter how it approaches problems. The increased emphasis on coordination, planning, and execution at the operational and strategic levels demands advances in civil affairs and civil-military operations to remain relevant by cultivating capabilities and structures throughout the spectrum of military operations.

Annex A¹

Figure A-1 Civil Affairs Battalion Functional Specialty Cell


FX SP Cell	
O4 38A	CA Generalist
O4 38A 6H	Public Safety Officer
O4 38A 6E	Civilian Supply Officer
O4 60C	Preventive Medicine Officer
O4 64B	Veterinary Preventive Medicine
O4 38A 6G	Public Facilities Officer
O4 27A	JAG Corps Attorney
E8 68W	Medic

Figure A-2 Civil Affairs Brigade Functional Specialty Cell



¹ Adapted from briefing slides provided by Master Sergeant Jeremy Burque, Staff NCO, Directorate of Special Operations Propriety (DSOP), U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, February 28, 2011.

Figure A-3 Civil Affairs Command Functional Specialty Cell



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Master Sergeant Jeremy Burque, Staff NCO, Directorate of Special Operations Propriety (DSOP), U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Interview by author, February 28, 2011, Fort Bragg, NC.

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